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U.S. security policy indicates that the United States Joint Forces will, in the future be engaged globally performing a variety of missions when necessary to protect U.S. national interests. In addition, evidence indicates that the existence of violent crime will also be a factor in future deployed environments. Experience in Iraq has illustrated that in addition to the conditions of an active insurgency, infrastructure decay, unemployment, and poverty, violent crime plays a significant role as a destabilizing factor and encumbers the meeting of Phase IV mission objectives. Human security, specifically, physical security of the population by controlling crime is significant to the operational commander for a number of reasons. Specifically, "winning hearts and minds" of the local populace, supporting the achievement of long-term strategic goals, reduction of collateral obstacles to mission accomplishment, assisting the counter-insurgency mission, as well as meeting other Phase IV objectives. Further, in light of current DoD posture of transformation of the armed forces, options such as changing the roles of current military police forces, constabulary options, and use of enhanced criminal investigative division assets all provide a potential capability to address the problem in the future.					
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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

**PLANNING FOR AND EMPLOYING CRIME CONTROL CAPABILITIES DURING
SECURITY AND STABILITY OPERATIONS, A NECESSARY
INGREDIENT FOR PHASE IV OPERATIONAL SUCCESS.**

by

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**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the
requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

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16 May 2006

Abstract

Planning for and employing crime control capabilities during Security and Stability operations, a Necessary Ingredient for Phase IV operational success.

U.S. security policy indicates that the United States Joint Forces will, in the future be engaged globally when necessary to protect U.S. national interests. In addition, evidence indicates that the existence of violent crime will also be a factor in future deployed environments. Experience in Iraq has illustrated that in addition to the conditions of an active insurgency, infrastructure decay, unemployment, and poverty, violent crime plays a significant role as a destabilizing factor and encumbers the meeting of Phase IV mission objectives. “Human Security”, specifically, physical security of the population by controlling crime is significant to the operational commander for a number of reasons. Specifically, “winning hearts and minds” of the local populace, supporting the achievement of long-term strategic goals, reduction of collateral obstacles to mission accomplishment, assisting the counter-insurgency mission, as well as meeting other Phase IV objectives. Further, in light of current DoD posture of transformation of the armed forces, options such as changing roles of current military police forces, constabulary options, and use of enhanced criminal investigative division assets all provide a potential capability to address the problem in the future.

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INTRODUCTION

Specialist (SPC) Bryan Johnson, an infantryman with the 3ID is conducting a dismounted patrol in downtown Ramadi, a city in Al Anbar province, Iraq. It is an especially hot day for September, and he never thought that he would be back in Iraq in 2012. He has traveled this route before and has gotten to know many of the local Iraqi people. Attacks on coalition forces have decreased over the recent months, and the patrol route is generally uneventful. Not today.

While passing a local market, SPC Johnson observes a black BMW sedan race up to a local vendor, six men with AK-47 rifles exit the car, grab the vendor, throw him into the back of the sedan and speed off. The entire event takes place in ten seconds. While this is the first time SPC Johnson has seen anything like this, it is not the first time he has heard of a kidnapping in downtown Ramadi. Over the past year, he been told numerous times of kidnappings, murder, and robbery within the local community, and the incidence of these events appears to be increasing. The people say they have no confidence in the local police, and some believe that they are involved in some of the criminal activities. The people want to know why the United States can crush a brutal dictator and a large army, but is unable keep them safe. SPC Johnson has no response.

Since the end of major combat operations in 2003, the crime rate in Iraq, specifically crimes of violence against the Iraqi populace has substantially increased.¹ This condition, coupled with an active insurgency, as well as other factors such as poverty, unemployment and infrastructure decay has served to be a significant source of instability within the country. Iraq has illustrated that performing security and stability operations to address these

¹ U.S. toll falls as Iraqi toll rises. The Providence Journal. 1 Apr 06. A:2.

sources of instability, in addition to an ongoing counterinsurgency mission, involves a myriad of tasks beyond traditional war fighting roles of our military forces.

While all these sources of instability are important, current operations in Iraq raises a significant issue with regards to military responsibility for “human security”. Specifically, crime control, accompanying policing duties, and future roles and missions of joint forces.

With the enormous responsibility and tasks already inherent in performing Phase IV operations, should crime control be integrated by the operational commander as a planning factor for future Phase IV security and stability missions?

Yes. The facts suggest that in light of the current U.S. national security policy, the recent application of the policy to the country of Iraq, and other evidence as well, the U.S. will, in the future, commit military forces to protect U.S. national interests. Further, the facts indicate that violent crime will be a significant source of instability in future environments where U.S. and coalition forces will operate. As such, the ability of the operational commander to establish “human security”, specifically, the provision of physical security to the local population through crime control will be a necessary prerequisite for effective transition from Phase IV to Phase V operations, as well as achieving the desired political endstate.

SCOPE

The examination of the issue will be limited in certain respects. This paper will focus on the significance of crime control for the operational commander during Phase IV operations, and the attendant necessity to possess the capability to address this problem. In regards to crime, the analysis and conclusions in the paper are derived from the impact of crimes of violence perpetrated against the indigenous civilian population. It will not address acts of

violence committed by, or against members of coalition forces. Further, crimes that are purely are purely economic in nature are generally excluded. While it can be argued that economic crimes such as bribery, for example, can have a causative impact on stability and overall good governance objectives during Phase IV operations, unlike most violent crime are not necessarily unlawful in every culture. In addition, the term “crime control” is used as a broad description to include activities such as deterrence, as well as law enforcement activities. Finally, the term Phase IV and security and stability operations are used synonymously throughout the discussion.

BACKGROUND

Facts support the conclusion that U.S. joint forces will, in the future, be committed to various environments and performing missions where violent crime will exist and likely be a destabilizing condition. The National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) provides clear intent of U.S. commitment to be actively engaged around the world.

Specifically, the strategy outlines a number of primary objectives where this intent for future involvement is evident. They include: Championing Aspirations of Human Dignity, Preventing Development of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Engaging the Opportunities and Challenges of Globalism. Upon close examination of each of these broad subject headings, one could, without much effort, infer a future mission involving U.S. military forces.²

There is other evidence as well. The National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy both complement the NSS and further illustrate this intent for future U.S. engagement worldwide. Specifically, the National Defense Strategy provides in part that “where dangerous political instability, aggression or extremism threatens fundamental

² The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington DC:2006), 1.

security interests, the United States will act with others to strengthen peace.”³ Similarly, the National Military Strategy provides in part that “[t]he National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the aims of the National Security Strategy and implements the 2004 National Defense Strategy.”⁴ Considering these sources as a whole, the broad and far reaching language of these sources identify the clear commitment of the U.S. to global engagement when acting in our national interests is necessary.

In addition to the intent to be actively committed to protect U.S. national interests, the facts suggest that in the current fluid, and sometimes volatile international environment, deteriorating regional conditions will pose a threat to U.S. interests. As such, this will also require commitment of joint forces.

Intelligence assessments on future global conditions suggest that various causes of instability will continue to be a threat to future U.S. security. The Defense Intelligence Agency contends that a variety of criminal activity will continue to “plague United States interests”.⁵ Further, non-government agencies also project that crime [in various countries around the globe] will increase within the next ten years with organized criminal networks forming alliances with smaller criminal groups and insurgent movements for specific operations.⁶ This can also be translated into an increase in instability.

³ The Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States, (Washington DC:2005), 7.

⁴ The Department of Defense, The National Military Strategy of the United States, (Washington DC: 2004), 1.

⁵ Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes (USA), “Statement”, U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Senate Select Intelligence, Global Threats and Challenges: The Decades Ahead, 109th Cong, 1st Sess., 2 February 1999.

⁶ National Intelligence Council Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernmental Experts (Washington: DC 2000), www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/globaltrends2015/index.html.

Considering both the clear intent of the U.S. to act when national interests are threatened, as well the likelihood of presence of violent crime as a destabilizing condition in areas where our national interests exist, one need not look far to identify the future relevance of the issue of crime control for the operational commander. The country of Nigeria provides an illustrative example where both U.S. intent to protect national interests exists, and disruptive societal conditions within the country make the issue of crime control relevant.

Current information indicates that “Nigeria is the fifth largest supplier of oil to the United States, and U.S. energy officials predict that within ten years, Nigeria, and the Gulf of Guinea region will provide a quarter of America’s crude.”⁷ Further, the current administration has determined that Nigeria specifically, and suggested that other African nations as well, are strategic national interests of the U.S. due to their exporter status of oil reserves. However, there is other information that makes this issue particularly significant to the discussion. Facts indicate that Nigeria is far from stable politically, with a substantial rebel faction that exists in the most northern provinces. Further, there exists a significant crime problem that, by most accounts, appears to be unmanageable by the current security structure. Specifically, extortion perpetrated on shopkeepers from gangs, robbery of the local populace by well-armed criminal thugs, as well as theft of oil from government pipelines.⁸ To further add to the problem, information suggests that the police force is corrupt and ineffective with allegations that they are actively involved in criminal activity, to include bribery and murder.

Based on consideration of all this information as a whole, one can infer that were conditions to emerge that threaten this interest, and diplomatic and the application of other

⁷ Jeffrey Taylor, “Worse than Iraq?” The Atlantic Monthly, 3 (Apr 2006): 33.

⁸ Ibid.

forms of national power were to fail, a U.S. military response to protect our national interests in Nigeria would be a distinct possibility. However, while Nigeria is a country that currently has a significant violent crime problem, it illustrates a larger, more general issue for the operational commander. Specifically, when joint forces are deployed and performing missions across the range of military options, current security structures will be disturbed and violent crime will likely increase, even in those regions where crime was previously not an issue. As such, it is necessary that the operational commander recognize the significance of violent crime in relation to his overall Phase IV mission, and also the need to possess a crime control capability to address this condition.

Finally, it is important to note that overall, current capabilities of Army and Marine infantry units deployed to Iraq do not possess an adequate crime control capability. Specifically, military police (MP) support currently provided to infantry units are equipped to handle traditional basic security functions such as area security and EPW issues. However, interviews with senior military police professionals indicate that the basic MP does not possess advanced felony level investigative abilities to effectively handle violent crimes of murder, kidnapping, and robbery within the indigenous population.⁹ Further, while there is a new Combat Brigade concept which will enhance the size of current MP employment to infantry units with a platoon sized element, there is no indication that the core capabilities of these units will be enhanced to permit the investigation of complex violent crime.¹⁰ On the contrary, the evidence suggests that the capabilities of these forces will reflect traditional MP roles.

⁹ Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Harris, U.S. Army, Student, Naval War College, Newport RI, interview by author, 12 April 06, Naval War College, Newport RI.

¹⁰ Ibid.

DISCUSSION / ANALYSIS

Examination of the issue will occur in two parts. First, why is crime control important to the operational commander? Second, what capability options are available for the operational commander to address this future condition?

Why is crime control important to the operational commander?

First, crime control is central to “win the hearts and minds” of the local populace, the lynchpin of counterinsurgency strategy, and cornerstone of establishing legitimacy during security and stability operations. Facts suggest that the crime rate against Iraqi civilians has increased substantially since the 2003. Specifically, some accounts indicate that the rate of civilians killed and injured since 2004 has increased to approximately 75 per day.¹¹ Crimes such as kidnappings, for example, are commonplace, and the facts suggest that they are on the rise. Specifically, “the number of kidnappings in Iraq is surging because of an explosion of criminal gangs working for their own gain or in conjunction with armed political groups. Numerous civilians are abducted every week with ransoms in excess of \$20,000 not being unusual.”¹² Further, homicides have also increased with the rate almost tripling from the period of May 2003 to March 2006.¹³ As a result of these conditions, facts indicate that many Iraqi’s in the Sunni Triangle area express significant security concerns; with three-quarters of Iraqi’s in Bagdad indicate that they do not feel safe in their neighborhood and region.¹⁴ Finally, and most telling, there are some sources that indicate

¹¹ “U.S toll falls as Iraqi toll rises,” The Providence Journal, 1 April 06, A:4

¹² Edward Wong and Kurt Semple, “Civilians in Iraq flee mixed areas as Killings rise,” The New York Times, 2 April 2006, at <http://www.ihl.com/articles/2006/04/02/news/outlook.php>

¹³ The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq (Washington, DC: 2006), 12. at <http://www.brook.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf> [6 May 2006].

that almost one-half of the population of Iraq approve of attacks on U.S. led forces in Iraq.¹⁵

Considering all this information as a whole, one can conclude that the ability to control violent crime is one factor that has a direct impact on the level of confidence of local indigenous population and their support for their local security and coalition forces.

Conversely, it can also be inferred that the failure to control this condition can result in not only lack of support for coalition and local security forces, but most significantly, result in an increase in support for violence against them. This clearly suggests that failure to control violent crime can amount to failure to “win hearts and minds”, and adversely affect long-term efforts to establish legitimacy, both crucial objectives for achieving a successful Phase IV end state.

Second, crime control is directly related to long-term strategic goals for Iraq and will be related to strategic goals for other Phase IV missions in the future. The United States Strategy for Victory in Iraq is defined as building a new, constitutional representative government that respects the civil rights of the people as well as *security forces to maintain domestic order* (emphasis added).¹⁶ The language that is used in this sentence is significant for the operational commander for two reasons. First, the broad language that is used specifically mentions security forces to maintain domestic order. These references illustrate the necessity of recognizing the significance of violent crime on mission objectives and achieving an effective capability to control crime as long-term strategic goals. Second, while the term “domestic order” is not defined elsewhere in the document, one can infer that this

¹⁴ Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Report on Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq. 109th Congress, 2nd sess., October 2005, 19. at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/20051013_publication_OSSRF.pdf [6 May 2006].

¹⁵ Ibid., 43.

¹⁶ The White House, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, (November 30, 2005) at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html

term was specifically chosen for its breadth, and necessarily includes the duty on the part of the operational commander to take a broader view of his mission. Specifically, the language suggests that “security forces to maintain domestic order” should be interpreted to require that the commander not only focus on the war fighting mission, but also the requirement to control crime as part of his overall phase IV mission requirements.

Third, crime control is identified in joint doctrine and requires that operational commanders consider the significance of crime on Phase IV objectives. Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations identifies law enforcement as a consideration that must be included in the planning and execution of multinational operations. Specifically, this current authority provides that the JFC should initially consider the use of indigenous personnel [for the task of law enforcement], however, if such forces are not available, the “JFC’s should consider deploying appropriate U.S. forces early in the deployment flow and should also consider using the law enforcement capabilities of other contributing nations.”¹⁷ This language highlights a number of significant points. The recognition by senior leaders of the importance of crime control with regard to achieving Phase IV objectives; the need to develop or obtain the capability to control crime across the range of military operations; and the need for the flexible use of law enforcement options even to the extent of incorporating coalition partners in the effort. These points highlight the importance that joint doctrine places on the issue of crime control to effectively execute Phase IV operations.

Fourth, crime control eliminates other collateral problems that emerge from a lack of population security. In addition to the impact that controlling violent crime has on the confidence of the local populace, and the meeting other security and stabilization objectives,

¹⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Pub 3-0. (Washington DC: 10 September 2001), VI-6.

it also has the impact of discouraging the emergence of other competing security mechanisms. The rise of various militia groups in Iraq is a good example. As of today, information indicates that there are numerous militia groups that have been formed over the past three years, due in part to a general feeling of insecurity that exists amongst the local populace. According to Saadoun al-Sahl, a furniture merchant that runs a business in Sadr city, “they [the Mahdi Army] protect us better than any security agency. . . if I or anyone has a problem, we go to the Mahdi Army to solve it.”¹⁸ This quote illustrates a significant point that is applicable to future military missions where violent crime will exist. Specifically, these facts indicate that if the local government cannot protect the people from violent crime, and the populace lacks confidence in the ability of the government to protect them, militia groups can, and will develop the confidence and loyalty of the people. This can translate into a perception of legitimacy on part of these organizations, increased militia recruitment and growth, and a host of other problems that can become especially problematic when the militia groups interests diverge with that of the established government.

Fifth, effective crime control can have a significant positive impact on counter-insurgency efforts. Aggressive investigation can yield significant evidence that ultimately, could favorably contribute to counter-insurgency efforts. One can argue that the distinction between those committing terrorist acts against members of the coalition, and those committing crimes of violence against the local populace are, at times, less than clear. However, it is reasonable to infer that there is, in some instances, an intersection between the two groups with some individuals who engage in both activities. With that in mind, the apprehension of individuals that are subject to a criminal investigation can yield a plethora of

¹⁸ “Base in Sadr City turned over to Iraqis” The Newport Daily News, 10 Mar 2006. A2.

favorable results. First and most obviously, it can result in the apprehension of a criminal who is also a terrorist. This can yield valuable information to aid law enforcement efforts as well as intelligence that can contribute to meeting broader Phase IV objectives. Second, the arrests can lead to criminals who, while not terrorists themselves, can provide information on the insurgency, and possibly would, in exchange for some type of leniency at trial or other incentives, provide cooperation. Third, awareness by the populace of a robust crime control effort in itself can have a deterrent effect on not only crime, but serve to deter and disrupt insurgent forces.

Sixth, implementation of an effective crime control capability not only lowers violent crime, but positively impacts other Phase IV objectives. U.S. Army experience in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) provides empirical evidence to support this conclusion. Specifically, an examination of the security posture of the districts in Uruzgan Province generally indicated that districts with a strong overall development assessment of the police program also had a higher assessment in the areas of preventing ACM influence, as well as the ability of the governor, local leaders and mayors to conduct community development meetings.¹⁹ Upon closer examination of one of the specific districts, the conclusion is further reinforced. The district of Khas Uruzgan, for example, provided for a development assessment of 74 % generally, with an overall development assessment of the police program of 80%. Further, the overall development assessment of the ability of the governor, district leader and mayor to meet on significant issues was 63%, and the prevention of ACM influence for the district was rated at 73%. Further, and most telling, this district also held the most impressive overall development assessment of security

¹⁹ Lieutenant Colonel Terry Sellers, U.S. Army, Professor, Department of Joint Military Operations, Naval War College, Newport RI, interview by author, 12 April 06, Naval War College, Newport RI.

in Uruzgan Province. This information is significant for a number reasons. First, it shows that there is a correlation between effective crime control and counter-insurgency influence and activities. Second, it illustrates that when an effective crime control mechanism is established, confidence is generated in government and community leaders to perform official business, matters essential to public administration and other similar good governance objectives. Further, while not specifically stated, one can conclude that this increased confidence also impacted the local Afghan people as well, encouraging them to engage in regular employment and normal societal activities, behavior that was previously suppressed by a strong ACM element or crime base. While one can argue that these statistics are limited to Afghanistan provinces and districts, it is reasonable to infer that regardless of the particular future geographic location that joint forces will operate, improvement in crime control will likely contribute to confidence of the local populace in their security institutions, the perception of legitimacy of their government, as well as support other general security and stability objectives.

What capability options are available to the operational commander to address this condition?

There are a number of different options for the operational commander to develop a crime control capability for future operations.

First, increasing the core capabilities of military police forces to include advanced training in felony level offenses is one possibility that has merit. As previously mentioned, current duties of MPs include basic security functions and generally do not include advanced training for more complex law enforcement duties, such as felony level investigations. However, increasing their roles to include the investigation of violent crime

in the indigenous community would not be an insurmountable hurdle to current doctrine. As previously discussed, joint doctrine provides the flexibility of the JFC to deploy “appropriate forces” to handle law enforcement issues in a deployed environment. As such, the use of this language provides the operational commander flexibility as well as authority to adequately train, and prepare current forces to ensure that they are capable to handle mission requirements. This would include the ability to ensure that MPs have the advanced training just discussed. There are other advantages to this approach as well. Use of MPs would allow consistency of command and control, as well as an easier ability to synchronize their investigative activities with ongoing efforts to achieve other objectives in the area of operations (AO). Further, there are some technological developments currently being employed by some U.S. forces in counter-insurgency operations that would permit a transition to crime control responsibilities. The use of Counter Insurgency Surveillance Technology currently in use in Iraq by some Marine units, is a prime example. This technology includes a wearable unit that automatically records a Marine’s observations, converts them into text, and transmits them back into a central database where the information is categorized and the location identified with a global positioning system location.²⁰ While this technology is currently being used as part of the counter-insurgency effort, the potential use of this capability to aid in violent crime investigations is significant.

There are other considerations that could amount to challenges with this approach, however. Additional time for advanced law enforcement training in criminal investigations would be required for the force to be effective. In addition, since advanced criminal investigative duties are currently handled by more senior and experienced members of the military law enforcement community, namely the criminal investigative division (CID), it is

²⁰ Matt Hillburn “Policing the Insurgents,” Sea Power 3 (Mar 2006): 44.

likely that the younger, less experienced Soldiers and Marines may lack the experience and intellectual rigor that this level of expertise requires.

Second, use of an international constabulary force to provide a crime control capability is another option that has been used in the past by the U.S., and offers a possibility in the future. During the occupation of Nicaragua from 1912 to 1933, U.S. Marines formed a constabulary force “The Guardia Nacional” which consisted of Nicaraguan personnel under the leadership of Marine officers whose duties were to conduct police functions specifically, as well as establish order.²¹ In addition, the U.S. was successful in the formation of other constabulary forces such as the Garde d’Haiti in Haiti in 1915, and the Guardia Nacional Dominica in the Dominican Republic in 1916.²² Both organizations reflected similar organization with a U.S. command and control element, as well as the incorporation indigenous personnel performing police functions. In addition, in post-war Germany, a constabulary model was again used, but further modified to include the use of U.S. occupation forces rather than indigenous personnel to conduct routine crime control functions. As such, while these cases illustrate the fact that the U.S. has been able to form a constabulary in the past, the effectiveness of these organizations as a crime control mechanism and their contribution to larger operational objectives is unclear. For example, in 1933 the development of an insurgency by Sandinista rebels resulted in the Guardia Nacional quickly being drawn into a counter-insurgency effort rather than concentrating on law enforcement activities.²³ Similarly, history indicates that the Guardia Nacional Dominica

²¹ Robert M. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When we need Him? America’s search for a Postconflict Stability Force (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press 2004), 54.

²² Ibid., 57.

²³ Ibid., 56.

developed a reputation among the local populace for abusive behavior, which in turn encumbered its effectiveness as a law enforcement organization. Further, the Guardia Nacional Dominica was subsequently transformed from a constabulary organization into a military force which essentially limited it's law enforcement role.²⁴ As a result, these examples raise a significant question of how successful the application of this model would be as a crime control mechanism in today's complex environment.

These examples do illustrate, however, a number of pertinent points for consideration by the operational commander. The U.S. has, in the past established constabulary forces as part of a military intervention in order to conduct law enforcement activities. In addition, the constabulary can be organized consistent with joint doctrine to provide for the use of U.S. command and control and incorporation of indigenous forces, or, on the other hand composed exclusively U.S. forces. Further, if a constabulary is established, the role of the force should be limited to law enforcement rather than war fighting missions. Finally, since the force will have the most contact with the indigenous population concerning an issue of significant importance, crime, the force must have sufficient training, discipline, and supervision to be viewed as effective, and most importantly legitimate.

Third, employ additional Criminal Investigative Division (CID) assets to provide crime control capability within the deployed environment. History indicates that the use of the U.S. Army CID for local crime control efforts in a deployed environment have been effective. In Kosovo for example, a CID contingent of approximately 30 personnel were assigned to the U.S. AOR in order to investigate local offenses, to include serious violent

²⁴ Ibid., 58.

crime.²⁵ The facts indicate that the investigative efforts of the organization included interviewing local witnesses, evidence collection, and advanced crime scene investigation. Evidence indicates that these activities were effectively performed with positive results to include criminal convictions.²⁶ Further, the facts indicate that CID was also effective in generating confidence of the local community in U.S. forces through their ability to effectively address serious crime both significant Phase IV objectives. There were drawbacks with this approach however, to include a shortage of interpreters, as well as insufficient CID personnel to handle the entire U.S. AOR. This experience illustrates a number of lessons that are applicable to future operations. CID is an established force equipped to handle felony level investigations, and, as Kosovo has illustrated, can provide an effective crime control capability in a deployed environment. As such, use of this capability for future operations will not require significant changes to doctrine to be accomplished. Further, while personnel numbers would need to be increased, the number and size of the force could be tailored to focus CID activity on areas that are hardest hit by violent crime. In Iraq for example, Bagdad and Tikrit areas traditionally having highest violent crime rates could be a focus of crime control effort.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The evidence suggests that the use of enhanced CID assets will be the most effective capability to employ in future environments to effectively address crime. While constabulary forces may seem an attractive option in light of the current focus of DOD on transformation, history has indicated the effectiveness of constabulary forces is less than clear, and also, has

²⁵ Harris, interview.

²⁶ Ibid.

the potential to cause undesirable second and third order effects that can have an adverse impact on other mission objectives. Further, while additional training and responsibility for MP units to address this issue may seem another option, the facts suggest that the use of ordinary MP units to conduct this type of mission may not be truly effective in conducting complex criminal investigations. As such, as history has indicated, CID will likely be the best choice. While there is a necessity for some modifications to current doctrine, use of this capability will be far less time consuming, less complex, and more quickly fielded than the other two options that were discussed.

CONCLUSIONS

Violent crime is likely to be a destabilizing condition in future environments where U.S. joint forces will operate. The operational commander needs to be cognizant of the importance of violent crime within his AO and the need to address it for a number of reasons. First, joint doctrine requires the JFC to effectively control crime as part of overall mission requirements. Next, evidence suggests that controlling crime is necessary to win the support of the local populace, to reduce the likelihood of collateral problems that arise from lack of populace security, and assist with counter-insurgency efforts. Finally, the facts suggest that crime control positively impacts other mission objectives and supports long term strategic goals. In sum, effective crime control is a significant factor that will, in the future, be essential to overall Phase IV mission success.

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